Dividing Lines would be a dry read if immigration control weren’t a hot issue now. And hey, maybe it’s still dry to you, but I found it interesting. It’s a blow-by-blow history of immigration policy in the United States since the founding, with special attention to the political coalitions that supported several very different policy regimes.
Warning: Second-order contrarianism.
You may remember this Propublica article from about a year ago, arguing that the COMPAS scores, a machine-learning algorithm that predicts risk of criminal recidivism, is racially biased. Their methodology was a bit strange and they made their data available openly, so I had been intending to reanalyze using more straightforward methods. Fortunately, several people have already done this, sparing me the effort; several of them found that according to commonly accepted standards, the COMPAS algorithm is not racially biased. The Washington Post also published an article, saying the question is complicated. Continue reading
I conducted three analyses and found that:
- There were a surprisingly large number of Obama/Trump voters, and with some exceptions they matched the media portrait – white, working class, low income, older, and Midwestern.
- These voters probably chose Trump based on racially loaded policy issues; in particular, “law and order” issues related to fear of criminal violence.
- These voters held economically populist views on a number of issues, even if those views did not drive their votes in the 2016 election. However, their economic views on most issues were at least slightly to the right of the views of Obama/Clinton voters.
All Mexican or New World ingredients. Except for the crust, I guess – I used a mix of wheat and maize flour. The sauce was tomatillo salsa. “Nopales” is the spanish word for the pads of the prickly pear cactus – a delicious, inexpensive vegetable.
I decided to try a Cantonese stir-frying technique called “velveting”, with the following results:
Many Democrats have wonder whether economic populism might help win the support of white working class Trump voters. We saw in Part 2 that economic populism didn’t seem to play much of a role for Obama/Trump voters in the 2016 election; however, it’s still possible that in a future election, focused on different issues, that approach might work. My third analysis explores that question. Note that as per previous analyses, I restricted this sample to white voters.